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Abstract: What do normative terms like ‘obligation’ mean in legal contexts? On
one view, which H.L.A. Hart may have endorsed, ‘obligation’ is ambiguous in
moral and legal contexts. On another, which is dominant in jurisprudence, ‘obli-
gation’ has a distinctively moralized meaning in legal contexts. On a third view,
which is often endorsed in philosophy of language, ‘obligation’ has a generic
meaning in moral and legal contexts. After making the nature of and disagree-
ments between these views precise, I show how linguistic data militates against
both rivals to the generic meaning view, and argue that this has significant impli-
cations for jurisprudence.
In his ‘LegalDuty andObligation’, H.L.A.Hart set out three common views
about the semantics of normative terms like obligation in legal contexts:
‘Obligation’ and ‘duty’ are frequently used in reference to both law and to morals, and also to
matters which do not fit into either of these two categories. But many philosophers (even as
diverse in outlook as O.W. Holmes and Kelsen) would deny that there is any unitary concept
of obligation and insist that only confusion arises from treating ‘legal obligation’ and ‘moral
obligation’ as species of a single genus. Others (including Bentham and John Stuart Mill) have
insisted that there is a common element determining the meaning of obligation in both legal
and moral contexts, and that the differences do not affect the meaning of obligation but
constitutes different species of obligation reflecting the different standards used in determining
what acts are obligatory. There is also the stronger view, advocated by some contemporary
writers, ... that not only is there a common element in legal and moral obligation but the former
is a species of the latter or at least in some sense presupposes it.1
Call the first view Hart mentions ‘the Ambiguity View’: there is no
univocal meaning (or ‘unitary concept’) of obligation as it is used in moral
and legal contexts. Hart is often read as endorsing this view: i.e. as denying
‘the identity of meaning of ‘obligation’ inmoral and legal contexts.’2 Call the
second ‘the Generic View’: there is a univocal meaning of obligation, and
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adjectives like legal and moral modify obligation in the exact same way: by
modifying the ‘standards used in determining what acts are obligatory.’Call
the third ‘the Moralized View’: obligation has a distinctively moral meaning
in legal contexts.
In this article I have four interrelated aims. First, I argue that we should
reject the Ambiguity View, as it is inconsistent with linguistic data and is less
parsimonious than its competitors. Second, I clarify the disagreement
between the remaining views, which is rarely discussed. The Generic View
has been largely ignored in contemporary jurisprudence, but is widely
accepted in other fields. TheMoralized View, by contrast, was first endorsed
by Joseph Raz, and has since become the dominant view in contemporary
jurisprudence;3 but it is largely ignored in other fields. To look ahead, I
argue that the disagreement concerns whether legal modifies obligation in
roughly the same way thatmoralmodifies obligation, or in roughly the same
way that Kantian modifies obligation.
Third, I argue theMoralizedView is also inconsistentwith linguistic data. I
demonstrate this with data about modifier stacking. WhenKantianmodifies
obligation by marking a distinct perspective about morality, it is acceptable
to stackmodifiers (Kantianmoral obligation) to clarify this. By contrast, legal
moral obligation is not an acceptable clarification of themeaning of legal obli-
gation. TheMoralized View predicts otherwise, as it takes legal obligation to
mark a distinct perspective aboutmorality. So we should reject this View.
Finally, I show that embracing the Generic View has important implica-
tions for jurisprudence. Some philosophers of law have gone so far as to
claim that ‘the moral semantics claim is absolutely essential to holding to-
gether the [legal] positivist picture of law’, such that ‘the [legal] positivist can-
not really live without the moral semantics claim.’4 I suspect that this is
hyperbolic.5 But I follow two paths to show that embracing the Generic
View matters in jurisprudence. First, by reconsidering central arguments
for its rivals: once we see what motivates the Ambiguity View and the
Moralized View, we can put pressure on common commitments about the
relationship between morality and law. (For instance: does law claim to be
morally authoritative, as Raz famously held?) Second, by reconsidering
arguments that invoke its rivals: once we reject the Moralized View, we lose
the most popular explanation for why legal positivism does not violate
Hume’s Law that one cannot derive an ought from an is. These points
illustrate the dialectical importance of claims about the meaning of legal
obligation and cognate terms for contemporary philosophy of law.
1. Why reject the ambiguity view?
Let’s start by clarifying the commitments of the Ambiguity View, in order to
see why it should be rejected. Consider these two sentences:
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1. Antigone is morally obligated not to bury Polynices.
2. Antigone is legally obligated not to bury Polynices.
As it was described by Hart, the Ambiguity View holds that moral
obligation and legal obligation are not species of the same genus.
Analogously, we might say that river banks and investment banks are not
species of the same genus. In other words, this View holds that obligated
is not univocal in moral and legal contexts; instead, it has different
meanings in sentences like (1) and (2).6
This View will face two related obstacles. The first concerns linguistic
data. It is standardly thought that the onus is on those who posit lexical
ambiguities to proffer linguistic data that supports their position,7 and
proponents of the Ambiguity View have put forward no such data. Worse
yet, when we apply standard tests for lexical ambiguity, they yield linguistic
data that is inconsistent with the Ambiguity View. For instance, one
standard test for lexical ambiguity uses Conjunction Reduction to elicit
probative data about zeugma.8 To illustrate, consider the following
sentences: ‘Pale colors are light’; ‘Feathers are light’; ‘Pale colors and
feathers are light.’ The first two sentences contain a purportedly ambiguous
term (light), while the third sentence conjoins those sentences using light only
once in a context that encourages both meanings. Here light seems
zeugmatic, in that it has been used once in relation to two parts of the
sentence (colors, feathers) and must be understood differently in relation to
each (in terms of brightness, and in terms of weight). This is evidence for
thinking that light is lexically ambiguous. Similarly, if obligated is lexically
ambiguous in (1) and (2), obligated should seem zeugmatic in (3):
3. Antigone is morally and legally obligated not to bury Polynices.
After all, (3) just conjoins (1) and (2), using the purportedly ambiguous
term (obligated) once in a context where both meanings are encouraged.
But we do not need to understand obligated differently in relation tomorally
and legally.
This is by nomeans the only standard test for lexical ambiguity. Elsewhere
I have argued that we obtain similar results when we apply other plausible
tests for ambiguity to deontic modals and other normative terms like
obligated.9 So the linguistic data are stacked against the Ambiguity View.
The second obstacle concerns theoretical virtues. A widely accepted
maxim in semantics is that we should not multiply meanings beyond neces-
sity.10 TheAmbiguity View is less parsimonious than its competitors, insofar
as it posits two distinct lexical entries formoral ought and legal ought, rather
than one entry for ought; mutatis mutandis for other normative terms. This
concern about parsimony is amplified when we note that it is not clear
why a proponent of this View would stop with distinct moral and legal
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oughts. Hart, recall, noted that obligation et al. ‘are frequently used in
reference to both law and to morals, and also to matters which do not fit into
either of these two categories.’ As Alex Silk recently noted in a related
context, there are ‘prudential “ought”s, rational “ought”s, legal “ought”s,
aesthetic “ought”s, and so on’; a consistent treatment of all such cases would
posit that speakers have ‘a proliferation of “ought” entries in their lexicons’,
and that position is both ‘profligate and unexplanatory.’11
There are responses available to proponents of the Ambiguity View.Most
promisingly, proponents of the View could posit that obligated is ambigu-
ous, but not homonymous: rather, it is polysemous. A univocal term has a
single meaning. An ambiguous term has multiple meanings. But the
meanings of ambiguous terms can be related or unrelated. Homonymous
terms, like bank (financial institution/riverbank), have multiple unrelated
meanings. Polysemous terms, like book (abstract work/concrete copy), have
multiple related meanings. If the hypothesis is that obligated and other
normative terms are polysemous, this will not yield linguistic data that
favors the Ambiguity View. But it might provide an alternative explanation
of linguistic data that seem to militate against the View. This is because the
standard tests for lexical ambiguity discussed above seem well designed to
distinguish univocality from homonymy; however, partly due to the
unresolved questions about the nature of polysemy,12 it is unclear whether
they reliably distinguish univocality from polysemy.13
The hypothesis that obligated is polysemous may also fare somewhat bet-
ter with respect to the aforementioned theoretical vices. Some hold that the
differentmeanings of a polysemous term form a single lexical entry; thismay
ameliorate the concern that the Ambiguity View is profligate. But it should
not undermine that concern entirely. As Falkum and Vicente (2015) note,
while some linguists ‘may distinguish between polysemy and homonymy
based on whether the different senses or meanings are thought to belong
to a single lexical entry or not, this difference does not seem to carry much
weight at the level of storage or of processing. In both polysemy and homon-
ymy, senses or meanings are thought to be stored as distinct representa-
tions.’14 If we postulate an indefinite number of distinct meanings for
obligated and other normative terms, we must then postulate an indefinite
number of distinct stored representations. This is not just ontologically
profligate; it is unexplanatory insofar as it suggests that processing simple
sentences would be far too confusing and cognitively demanding (especially
in everyday conversations where obligated et al. are relativized to standards
that are not made explicit by the use of adverbs like legally).15
Perhaps the problem here is not the hypothesis that normative terms are
polysemous, but the general view that different meanings of a polysemous
term are stored as distinct representations. Some linguists deny this, holding
instead that the different meanings of a polysemous term either belong to or
depend upon a single representation. There are various ways of cashing this
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out. For instance, Ruhl (1989) held that the different meanings of a polyse-
mous term all share a single core abstract meaning. This might provide a
better explanation of linguistic processing. It also might help explain general
features of the meanings of deontic modals. For instance, in general,
obligation and permission are interdefinable: ‘Antigone legally must bury
Polynices’ is equivalent to ‘It is not the case that Antigone legally can not
bury Polynices’; mutatis mutandis for morally must and morally can, and
for any other normative standard to which must and can are relativized.16
What would explain this pattern? Views which take deontic modals to be
univocal have significant explanatory power insofar as they can offer one
meaning of must, and one meaning of can, which explain why the two are
interdefinable. Views on which deontic modals are ambiguous (at least in
moral and legal contexts) seem to owe us multiple explanations for this
single pattern, and other similar patterns in English,17 and other natural
languages.18 But they might be able to provide a single explanation if they
posit that each normative term has a single core abstract meaning.
This seems more promising. However, once we adopt any view of
polysemy like this, proponents of the Ambiguity View will struggle to vindi-
cate their commitments about the differences between the meanings of terms
like obligated in moral and legal contexts. Specifically, they will struggle to
explain how these different meanings fall under one core abstract meaning.
This is a specific instance of a more general problem. Proponents of the
Ambiguity View hold that the meanings of obligated in moral and legal con-
texts are not just different, but unrelated.19 It is hard to square that position
with the hypothesis that these meanings are related in some deep way, let
alone with the hypothesis that there is a single core meaning for terms like
obligated in moral and legal contexts. Indeed, once one adopts this under-
standing of polysemy in order to provide a semantic theory that is
sufficientlymodest and explanatory, it is hard to specify why one has not just
embraced the Generic View under another name.
2. What do the generic and moralized views (dis)agree about?
So far I have argued against the Ambiguity View. This is, however, by no
means my central aim in this article, for two reasons. First, there is a great
deal of literature about this general type of disagreement – about univocality
and ambiguity – in linguistics and philosophy. Far less has been said about
the specific disagreement between the Generic and Moralized Views, and
indeed it is hard to locate any similar disagreement apropros non-legal
language. Second, the Generic and Moralized Views are both dominant,
albeit in different fields.
For my purposes, then, it need not matter if you thinkmore can be said on
behalf of the Ambiguity View. Consider the forgoing arguments a mere
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appetizer before the main course. If we are persuaded by these appeals to
linguistic data, parsimony and explanatory power, which of the other Views
should we accept about the semantics of normative terms in legal contexts?
So stated, it is hard to answer the question because the difference between
theGeneric andMoralizedViews is unclear. TheseViewsagree thatobligated
has a single meaning in moral and legal contexts. But they disagree about
whether that single meaning is in some sense moral. What does this mean?
The debate between these views is rarely discussed directly.20 My aim in
this section is to remedy that problem. I start by saying what the Views
agree about. This be provide a useful common ground in at least three
important ways: (a) it will set the stage for explaining what they disagree
about; (b) it helps assuage some concerns one might have about the
Moralized View;21 and (c) it undercuts some motivations that have been
offered for the Moralized View.22 I will mostly dwell on the first of these
points as that is our main focus.
Insofar as the Generic and Moralized Views agree that obligated has a
single meaning in moral and legal contexts, I propose that both Views
should be interpreted as agreeing about the formal semantics for obligated.
Interestingly, this makes this disagreement quite different from the disagree-
ments these Views have with the Ambiguity View. One standard way of
explaining the univocality of a normative term like ought, in our formal
semantics, is to take ought to mean a Kaplanian character: a function from
contexts to contents. This is the formal semantics that Angelika Kratzer
(1977, 2012), among others, have developed.
The crucial innovation from Kratzer is that normative terms are relativ-
ized to both a circumstantial background and an ordering source. The for-
mer represents the descriptive information that we hold fixed. Notice that
we can explicitly shift the circumstantial background: ‘Given what she
knows, Antigone should bury Polynices. But given the facts, she should not
do so.’The latter represents the demands of the relevant standard. Notice that
we can also explicitly shift the ordering source: ‘According to morality, she
should bury Polynices. But according to the law, she should not do so.’
Typically, both the circumstantial background and ordering source are left
implicit, and made salient to the audience by features of the context. For
the sake of clarity I am using modifiers to make the ordering source explicit;
this makes our examples somewhat stilted.
We can illustrate Kratzer’s approach by taking the following truth-condi-
tional function to be our candidate for the character, or univocal meaning,
of obligated:
Obligatedf g φ ¼ 1 iff∀w w∈ F½ ½ ∩ G½ ½ ð Þ⊃w∈ φ½ ½ ð Þ:
Let’s walk through what this formalism means, then illustrate its applica-
tion to the examples above. The ‘circumstantial background’ f provides a set
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of propositions, F, which represents the relevant circumstances. The ‘order-
ing source’ g provides a set of propositions,G, which represents the demands
of the relevant standard. Then we consider the intersection of those two sets
of propositions: roughly, we look at all the worlds that are consistent both
with the relevant circumstances and with the demands of the relevant
standard.23 It is true that ‘A is obligated to φ’ iff ‘A φs’ at all of those worlds:
i.e. at every world in the intersection of F andG. This is fairly abstract. Let’s
apply it.
Consider (2): ‘Antigone is legally obligated not to bury Polynices’. What
would the relevant circumstances be? A set of propositions like ‘Polynices
died attacking Thebes’. That will give us F. What will the demands of the
relevant legal standard be? A set of propositions like ‘If x died attacking
Thebes, no one buries x’. That will give us G. Hopefully it is now clear
howwe could consider the intersection of F andG: it will be all of the worlds
that are consistent a set of propositions like ‘Polynices died attacking
Thebes’ and ‘If x died attacking Thebes, no one buries x’.24 In any of those
worlds, does Antigone bury Polynices? No. So this tells us that (2) is true:
‘Antigone is legally obligated not to bury Polynices’ is true iff ‘Antigone does
not bury Polynices’ is true at every world in the intersection of F and G. It
should be clear how this approach can apply in the exact same way to (1):
when we switch from legally to morally, we switch the ordering source to a
different set of propositions which represents the demands of morality, e.g.
‘No one leaves their kin unburied’.
There are many important questions to ask about the details of how this
approach should be implemented, but we need not dwell on them. The
specific formalism above does not matter at all for our purposes. What
matters is the broad ambition behind this formal semantics: to explain the
meaning of obligated in terms of a truth-conditional function, wherein uses
of obligated are explicitly or implicitly relative to different ordering sources
(legality; morality).
This formal semantics is perfectly consistent with the spirit and the letter
of the Generic andMoralized Views. And it should be taken as the common
ground that these Views agree about. For one thing, the Kratzerian
approach illustrated above has been described as the ‘dominant’, ‘canoni-
cal’, and ‘textbook’ formal semantics by such people as Kai von Fintel
and John Horty.25 Proponents of the Moralized View should welcome the
result that they need not take up arms against the textbook formal seman-
tics, especially since they have provided no rival account of the formal
semantics for normative terms. There is an even more important reason
why proponents of the Moralized View should embrace this formal
semantics, but I will not focus on it.26
If we take it as given that the Moralized and Generic Views agree about
the formal semantics, we can understand their disagreement as concerning
the interpretation of how modifiers change the ordering source. To warm
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up to this, notice that we use the same machinery (ordering sources) to
represent two different phenomena, which are intuitively distinct in the
following sentences:
(4) Morally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices. But prudentially she
ought to do so.
(5) Morally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices. But Creon thinks that
morally she ought to do so.
There is an intuitive difference between how prudentially andCreon thinks
that morally modify the term ought in (4) and (5). Let’s introduce some
jargon to mark this difference. In (4), prudentially marks a different norma-
tive source. Metaethically, we might say that morality and prudence are
distinct sources of requirements.What Creon thinks is not a distinct source
of requirements. Rather, it is a distinct perspective about moral require-
ments. This intuitive distinction makes no difference at the level of the
formal semantics we illustrated above: prudentially and Creon thinks that
morally modify ought in the same way, namely, by taking us to a distinct
ordering sources, or set of demands.27
This distinction bears some similarities to a distinction that Shapiro
(2006) drew between adjectival and qualified readings of legal as it modifies
normative terms such as ought. Here’s how he summarized that point in
Legality:
When claims sans the word ‘legal’ are made, they express propositions with moral significance.
To say that you are obligated to pay your taxes, for example, implies that you morally ought to
pay your taxes. When the word ‘legal’ is used to preface the use of normative terminology, the
speaker might be either expressing her judgment about a moral reason for action (namely, that
the reason results from the operation of a legal institution) or exploiting the perspectival interpre-
tation of the word.28
There are some serious problems with Shapiro’s view here. The first two
sentences assert – without, in context, any argument – that by default, bare
deontic modals (like ought) and cognate terms like obligated are understood
as being relativized to morality: ‘you ought not split infinitives’ implies that
youmorally ought not split infinitives. Indeed, read literally, the first quoted
sentence says that all normative claims sans the modifier legal imply moral
propositions: even ‘you grammatically ought not split infinitives’ implies
that youmorally ought not split infinitives. This is amistake.29 The final sen-
tence offers what Shapiro takes to be the two possible interpretations of the
modifier legal: the adjectival interpretation onwhich it marks what I will call
the ground of a moral or prudential reason (see §3 below), and the perspec-
tival interpretation on which it marks a perspective on moral or prudential
reasons. I agree with Shapiro that one option for interpreting legal is that
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itmarks a perspective in this way; but I do not thinkwemust choose between
this and an adjectival interpretation.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Moralized and Generic Views is
best understood in terms of a disagreement about how to interpret the
modifier legal: the former insists on a perspectival interpretation, while
the latter insists on a fairly natural interpretation that Shapiro does not
even consider as a possibility. According to the Generic View, in (1)–(3)
morally and legally modify obligated in the same way: by marking a differ-
ence in the source of Antigone’s requirements. There is one generic mean-
ing of obligation, and (in Hart’s words) moral and legal obligation
constitute ‘different species of obligation reflecting the different standards
used in determining what acts are obligatory.’ By contrast, according to
the Moralized View, in (1)–(3) morally and legally modify obligated in
different ways: morally marks the source of Antigone’s requirements, while
legally marks a perspective about moral requirements. In Hart’s terms,
‘not only is there a common element in legal and moral obligation but
the former is a species of the latter or at least in some sense presupposes
it.’ The idea of a perspective on moral obligations presupposes the idea
of moral obligations.
Outside of contemporary jurisprudence, the Moralized View does not
have a wide allegiance. In fact, it is largely ignored. Kratzer herself treats
legal, prudential, and moral ordering sources in exactly the same way: she
says that ‘what the law provides’, ‘what is good for you’, and ‘what is moral’
each provides a distinct ‘ideal’ or source of requirements.30 Michael Ridge
writes that a ‘legal standard issues a requirement’, and later clarifies that
he takes legal standards to be a source of requirements.31 The Generic View
is also widely accepted in other subdisciplines. In his discussion of require-
ments, for instance, John Broome claims that the only viable interpretation
of legal requirement is that ‘the law is a source of requirements.’32 The
thought that legal might instead mark a perspective does not seem to be
seriously entertained.
Within contemporary philosophy of law, however, the Moralized
View is dominant. Since the View is rarely developed with any discussion
of formal semantics, the details of the View can seem fuzzy. Jules
Coleman, for instance, defends what he calls ‘the moral semantics claim’:
‘that legal content is best understood as moral directives about what is to
be done.’ He goes on to elaborate that the ‘moral semantics thesis is the
view that the content of law can be truthfully redescribed as expressing
a moral directive or authorization.’33 I do not typically understand
claims about semantics in terms of claims about truthful (or ‘accurate’)
redescription. But as Coleman notes, ‘Raz and Shapiro are among the
strongest advocates of the moral semantics claim’,34 and the latter at least
states his view quite clearly: Shapiro tells us that the claim that one is
legally obligated to perform some action ‘may be understood to mean
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that from the legal point of view one is (morally) obligated to perform
that action’.35
By contrast, Raz’s position is somewhat harder to parse. Raz has
argued that ‘statements of what ought to be done according to law ...
simply state what one has reason to do from the legal point of view’.36
Two crucial details of this picture need to be filled in. First, to state what
is the case from the legal point of view is at least analogous to stating
‘what is the case from the point of view of [a] theory or on the assumption
of the theory’;37 Shapiro has made similar remarks.38 And second, that
the relevant propositions are propositions about exclusionary moral
(or ‘content-independent’) reasons, which are the analysans of moral
obligations.39 Others have similarly formulated the Moralized View in
terms of reasons: for instance, Leslie Green writes that “legally speaking
there is an obligation to φ’ means that from the point of view of the
law there are binging reasons to φ and exclusionary reasons not to act
on some of the reasons to the contrary’,40 where the latter is offered as
an analysis of moral obligation.
It is striking how little engagement there is between advocates of the
Generic andMoralized Views. In jurisprudence, the latter is often portrayed
as the only alternative to the Ambiguity View. For instance, Scott
Hershovitz writes:
Some people think that there is a distinctively legal domain of normativity, separate from other
normative domains like morality ... Other positivists, however, think that law employs the same
concept of obligation as morality so ... claims about a person’s legal obligations are really claims
about her moral obligations.41
Hershovitz, to be clear, is summarizing a central motivation for Raz’s po-
sition.42 But he seems to endorse the conditional that if legal and moral lan-
guage involve the same ‘concept of obligation’, it must be a distinctively
moral concept of obligation. This ignores the position that law and morality
share a generic concept of obligation. An analogy might be helpful in
explaining why this is a mistake. We saw above that obligation has a
Kaplanian character, just like indexicals (I, you): that is, obligation can be
relativized to standards (moral, legal) in the way that I can be relativized
to speakers (me, you). It would be a mistake to say that all uses of I share
the same meaning, so all uses of I are really claims about me (the author
of this article, and the content of my uses of I). Likewise, it is a mistake to
say that all uses of obligation share the same meaning, so all uses of obliga-
tion are really claims about moral obligations.43
The above shows that the Moralized View is often poorly motivated
by its proponents. But it does not amount to an objection to the View
itself. I will now argue, however, that linguistic data militate against the
Moralized View.
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3. Why reject the moralized view?
Having clarified what the Generic and Moralized Views agree and dis-
agree about, we are now well placed to see why the latter should be
rejected. Recall that Raz and Shapiro take ‘the legal point of view’ to
be analogous or identical to the perspective of a normative theory.
Neither has pointed this out,44 but this provides a helpful analogue for
their view about how legal modifies obligation. Consider how adjectives
like Kantian or utilitarian modify obligation. At the level of our formal
semantics, they contribute distinct orderings (just like moral, prudential,
and legal). But intuitively, one’s Kantian obligations just are one’s moral
obligations according to the point of view of the Kantian moral theory.
Kantianism and utilitarianism are distinct perspectives about moral
obligations, not distinct sources of moral obligations. Aside from the
small point that Kantian and utilitarian lack an adverbial form (like
legally), everything that Raz says about legal obligation seems to be true
of Kantian and utilitarian obligation. For instance, it is crucial for Raz
that we can say:
6. Antigone has a legal obligation not to bury Polynices, but she has no
moral obligation not to do so
when we do not endorse the legal point of view. Similarly, we can say:
7. Antigone has a Kantian obligation not to bury Polynices, but she has
no moral obligation not to do so
when we do not endorse the Kantian point of view. Ditto for utilitarian.
So far we have seen that according to the Moralized View, legalmodifies
obligation in the same way that Kantian and utilitarian modify obligation.
This lets us make testable predications about how legal obligation should
function in discourse: namely, it should function in the way Kantian obliga-
tion functions. However, there is at least one obvious, important difference
between how thesemodifiers function.Kantian can be ‘stacked’ in a way that
legal cannot.
To ‘stack’ modifiers is to string together multiple modifiers before a
noun. For instance, one can have a highly demanding obligation to give
away one’s property, or a utilitarian obligation to do so, or a highly
demanding utilitarian obligation to do so. Likewise, one could have a
highly demanding legal obligation to pay one’s taxes. Sometimes
modifier stacking results in sentences that are intuitively unacceptable
because they are ‘semantically anomalous’ – that is, they can only be
ascribed a bizarre meaning – even though they are grammatical. This is
typically designated with a # symbol. Chomsky’s famous example
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‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’ is an instance of this phenomenon:
while it is grammatical to do so, we cannot stack colorless and green (let
alone as modifiers of ideas) without producing a semantically anomalous
sentence.
Nowwe can consider two sentences that will provide useful linguistic data:
8. Antigone has a Kantian moral obligation not to bury Polynices.
9. # Antigone has a legal moral obligation not to bury Polynices.
In (8), Kantian andmoral can be stacked in a way that is perfectly accept-
able. Since Kantian designates a perspective on our moral obligations,
‘Kantian moral obligation’ has a clear meaning; in fact, intuitively it has
the same meaning as ‘Kantian obligation’, as moral just clarifies what the
Kantian point of view is about. (Similarly, in (5) we could have said ‘Creon
thinks that’ or ‘Creon thinks that morally’; the addition of morally merely
clarifies what Creon’s thoughts are about.) But this interpretation of (9) is
not available.
I take (9) to be semantically anomalous. Here I am primarily relying on
data from introspection, which is common in linguistics but contentious all
the same. Still, if one does not share this judgment – that is, if one takes ‘legal
moral obligation’ to be acceptable – that may well be fine for my purposes.
Whatmatters here is not whether (9) is semantically anomalous, but whether
(9) is equivalent in meaning to the first conjunct of (6): that is, whether ‘legal
moral obligation’ just clarifies the meaning of ‘legal obligation’ in the way
that ‘Kantian moral obligation’ just clarifies the meaning of ‘Kantian
obligation’. This is what the Moralized View predicts. But it seems to be
quite implausible.
In fact, the best interpretation of (9) I can think of is to take legal to mark
what we might call the ‘ground’ of the relevant moral obligation.45 (I do not
think that this interpretation is very plausible, but proponents of the
Moralized View might wish to take this route as a Hail Mary pass.) To
clarify this suggestion, consider how promissory and familialmodify obliga-
tion. For instance, a promissory obligation is amoral obligation that one has
because of a promise (that one has made, presumably). This provides
another way that we can understand stacked modifiers in this context.
‘She has a promissory moral obligation to pick me up from the airport’ is
acceptable. Here promissory marks the ground (a promise) that makes it
the case that she has a moral obligation. Similarly, we might interpret (9)
to mean that the law made it the case that Antigone had a moral obligation
not to bury Polynices. If we have this interpretation inmind, we should agree
that the following is unacceptable:
10. # Antigone has a legal moral obligation not to bury Polynices, but
she has no moral obligation not to do so.
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in the same way that ‘She has a promissory moral obligation to pick me
up from the airport, but she has no moral obligation to do so’ is
unacceptable. This example is also helpful in highlighting how unhelpful
the grounds interpretation is for those who accept the Moralized View:
modifiers that mark the grounds of obligations are factive, whereas those
that mark perspectives are not. If one has a promissory moral obligation,
it follows that one has a moral obligation.46 By contrast, if one has a
Kantian moral obligation, it does not follow that one has a moral obliga-
tion because as a perspective Kantianism can be false. A central tenet of
the Moralized View as it is defended by Raz, Shapiro, Green, and
Coleman is that the law provides a perspective that can be false. Without
this, the Moralized View would support a form of legal anti-positivism,
along the lines defended by Dworkin (2011), Greenberg (2014) and
Hershovitz (2015): legal obligations would be, in Hart’s words, a species
of moral obligations.
So far we have seen that the Moralized View does not explain the
linguistic data about sentences involving stacked modifiers, such as (9).
This is evidence against the Moralized View. But it is not yet evidence
that favors the Generic View over the Moralized View. Does the Generic
View also have a problem in explaining these linguistic data? No. Leaving
aside alternative interpretations like the one in the above paragraph, the
Generic View predicts that (9) will be unacceptable. One can stack a
perspective (Kantian) and the source (moral) that this perspective is
about. One can stack a ground (promissory) and the source (moral) of
the obligation that is grounded. But one cannot stack separate sources
of obligations: ‘Antigone had a moral prudential obligation to bury
Polynices’ and ‘Antigone had a prudential moral obligation to bury
Polynices’ are semantically anomalous, just as (9) at least prima facie
appears to be.
This completes my argument against the Moralized View, and in favor of
the Generic View. The former makes testable predictions about the meaning
of constructions like stacked modifiers, and those predictions are strikingly
at odds with linguistic data. If we reject the Ambiguity View in part because
it is inconsistent with linguistic data, we should reject theMoralized View for
the same reason. Since the Generic View explains these data, it should be
preferred.
4. Why does this matter?
What’s at stake in the debate between these Views? Assuming that we should
accept the Generic View and reject its rivals, why does this matter? Below I
will focus on two ways of teasing out implications of our discussion for
jurisprudence.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY802
© 2018 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2018 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
4.1. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENERIC VIEW: ARGUMENTS FROM ITS RIVALS
One way to tease out implications of our discussion of the Generic View
involves reconstructing arguments from its rivals. If these rivals are false,
these arguments give us no ground for believing their conclusions. That’s
important.
Since the Ambiguity View is widely rejected, it is perhaps unsurprising
that most of the relevant arguments in jurisprudence invoke the Moralized
View. Perhaps the clearest and important appeal to the Moralized View in
philosophy of law concerns Hume’s is/ought gap.47 To set the scene, con-
sider what Shapiro calls one of the central problems for ‘all forms of legal
positivism’:
According to the legal positivist, the content of the law is ultimately determined by social facts
alone. To know the law, therefore, one must (at least in principle) be able to derive this informa-
tion exclusively from knowledge of social facts. But knowledge of the law is normative whereas
knowledge of social facts is descriptive. How can normative knowledge be derived exclusively
from descriptive knowledge? That would be to derive facts about what one legally ought to do
from judgments about what is the case. Legal positivism, therefore, appears to violate the fa-
mous principle introduced by David Hume (often called ‘Hume’s Law’), which states that one
can never derive an ought from an is.48
Raz calls this ‘the problem of the normativity of law’, and like Shapiro he
takes the problem to centrally concern ‘the use of normative terms to
describe the law.’49 Raz’s proposed solution to the problem was that ‘the
way to explain statements of what ought to be done according to law’ is that
such sentences ‘state what is the case from the point of view of the theory’;
while (1) is a normative statement, (2) is ‘a normative statement from a
point of view.’50 The details of Raz’s proposed solution are both unclear
and (unnecessarily) controversial;51 Shapiro’s proposed solution takes a
similar but simpler form.
According to Shapiro, ‘on the perspectival interpretation of the word
‘legal,’ statements of legal authority, legal rights, and legal obligations are
descriptive, not normative. They describe the normative point of view of
the law.’ So legal positivism ‘conforms to Hume’s law’: when we derive
information about what we legally ought to do exclusively from knowledge
of social facts, this ‘does not involve the derivation of an ought from an is,
but rather an is from an is.’52
If we reject the Moralized View, Raz and Shapiro’s proposed solution to
the problem posed by Hume’s Law fails. If statements about what one is
legally obligated to do, unlike statements of Kantian obligations, do not de-
scribe what one is morally obligated to do according to some normative the-
ory, then they have offered no good explanation for why such legal
statements are descriptive rather than normative. Now, this might not be
troubling if there were a good alternative route for classifying such legal
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statements as descriptive; but Shapiro explicitly disavows other options in an
effort to shore up his preferred solution.53 So this leaves us with an unsolved
puzzle for legal positivists: an explanation is still owed for why positivism
does not violate Hume’s law, and by Raz and Shapiro’s lights this one of
the central problems in philosophy of law.
4.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENERIC VIEW: ARGUMENTS FOR ITS RIVALS
Not everyone is persuaded that the is/ought gap poses a genuine problem
for positivists. So, let’s turn to another way to tease out implications of
our discussion, by reconstructing arguments for rivals to the Generic View.
If these rival views are false, at least one premise of each of these valid
arguments must go. This is important, as these arguments all hinge in part
on common core philosophical commitments about the relationship
between morality and law.54
It is worth noting a few things in advance. First, rejecting the relevant core
commitment about the relationship betweenmorality and lawwill not be the
only option; in many cases, we may wish to reject the other premise of the
argument, which will often be the premise that has received far less attention.
Second, appealing to the truth of the Generic View to show that we should
reject premises in arguments for its rivals may strike many as patently
question-begging. I do not think that it is, however. The first virtue of a
semantic theory should be to fit and explain the relevant linguistic data,
and the rivals to Generic View fail to meet that desideratum. This strike
against rivals to the Generic View outweighs any considerations that have
been marshaled in their favor. Some may disagree, however, with this way
of weighing desiderata; given that, I will show that rejecting the relevant pre-
mises can be independently motivated.
Enough preamble. Let’s turn to the arguments themselves. First, consider
the best argument I know of for the Ambiguity View, fromRichard Holton:
[O]n the account proposed here, ‘P is legally obligatory’ does not entail ‘P is morally obligatory’.
So ‘legally obligatory’ and ‘morally obligatory’ mean different things. However, that does not
show that ‘obligatory’ has a different sense in each construction [...]. There is, though, a consid-
eration which has lain behind much of our discussion so far, and which does show that ‘obliga-
tory’ has different senses in the two constructions. Statements of legal obligation are made true
simply in virtue of social facts; that is guaranteed by the truth of the social thesis. Statements of
moral obligation, in contrast, are not. In short, they fall on either side of the is/ought divide.
Since they have such radically different sorts of truth conditions, we can quite reasonably think
of them as having distinct meanings.55
Holton’s argument seems to be: If ‘P is legally obligatory’ is made true in
virtue of social facts and ‘P is morally obligatory’ is not, then ‘obligatory’
has a different sense in each construction; ‘P is legally obligatory’ is made
true in virtue of social facts and ‘P is morally obligatory’ is not; so,
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‘obligatory’ has a different sense in each construction [i.e. the Ambiguity
View is true]. This is a valid argument for a false conclusion, so one of the
premises must be false.
One could deny premise two either by rejecting legal positivism or by em-
bracing, say, moral conventionalism. Either way, wewould have to give up a
common (though by no means consensus) philosophical commitment that
there is an important difference in the types of facts explain moral and legal
facts.56
The simpler option, however, is to reject premise one. It rests on amistake.
The mistake that Holton makes here is one that was ably diagnosed by
Kevin Toh in a different context: Holton has conflated truth conditions with
grounds.57 Notice the slide in the final three sentences from statements being
‘made true in virtue of’ something to statements having ‘different sorts of
truth-conditions’.
Consider the formal semantics that was set out above. What it tells us is
the truth-conditions of statements of the form ‘P is obligatory’, including
when it is relativized to different standards; in other words, it tells us that
‘P is legally obligatory’ and ‘P is morally obligatory’ do not have radically
different sorts of truth conditions. That’s what gives us the univocality of
‘obligatory’. It does not require us to take a stand on in virtue of what these
statements are true.58
Now let’s turn to two common arguments for the Moralized View. These
aremore difficult to reconstruct without getting tangled in exegetical matters
that I wish to avoid for the sake of brevity. The reconstructions that I offer
are reasonable, and interesting in their own right.
The ‘decisive’ argument that Raz offered for the Moralized View was:
The decisive argument concerning themeaning of statements of legal duties is that the law claims
for itself moral force. No system is a system of law unless it includes a claim of legitimacy, of
moral authority. That means that it claims that legal requirements are morally binding, that is
that legal obligations are real (moral) obligations arising out of the law.59
Raz’s argument seems to be: If necessarily legal systems claim to be mor-
ally authoritative, then ‘obligatory’ has a moral meaning in legal contexts;
necessarily, legal systems claim to be morally authoritative; so, ‘obligatory’
has a moral meaning in legal contexts [i.e. the Moralized View is true].
Again, this is a valid argument for a false conclusion, so one of the premises
must be false.
It is not immediately obvious what can be said in favor of the first premise.
When we turn to a further argument from Raz, however, we will see that
there is an indirect route to thinking that this first premise is fairly plausible.
What about the second premise? Is it true that, necessarily, law claims au-
thority? An interesting observation about this Razian commitment is that
Raz appeals to it in his ‘decisive argument’ for the Moralized View, then
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appeals to the Moralized View in arguing for the commitment.60 To use the
commitment to motivate the Moralized View, we need an independent argu-
ment for it.
Are there good independent arguments for the Razian commitment
that necessarily law claims authority? Consider the centerpiece of
John Gardner’s defense of this commitment in the relevant section of his
chapter ‘How Law Claims, What Law Claims’. After arguing that how
law makes claims is through legal officials, Gardner turns to what law
claims:
The place to begin, nobody doubts, is with the language that law-applying officials use. In
explaining the law, they cannot but use the language of obligations, rights, permissions, powers,
liabilities and so on. What they thereby claim – and they cannot say it without claiming it – is
that the law imposes obligations, creates rights, grants permissions, confers powers, gives rise
to liabilities, and so on. The question is: What do these claims amount to?
Some people hold that the full necessary extent of the claims made by officials who use
this language is that there are legal obligations, legal rights, legal permissions, legal powers,
legal liabilities, and so on. Now it is certainly true that there are such things, and that their
existence can be and routinely is claimed by law-applying officials. But this claim cannot be
law’s claim. Why? Because a legal obligation or right is none other than an obligation or
right that exists according to law. And an obligation of right that exists according to law
is none other than an obligation or right, the existence of which law claims. So the claim that
there is a legal obligation or right – whether made by a law-applying official or by anyone
else – is a second-order claim, a claim about what law claims. Now it is true, of course, that
law could make a second-order claim about its own claims. But not this one. For as we
already learnt, a claim has to be capable of being true or false. It is not a claim unless there
is logical space for its falsity. And it makes no sense to attribute to law a false claim about
these legal obligations and rights, for there is no criterion of legal truth and falsity that is
independent of law...
It is against this background that the proposal emerges that law’s own claim is a moral one:
that when, according to law, there are obligations and rights and so on, law’s claim is that these
are moral obligations and rights and so on, not merely legal ones.61
I quote this at length to highlight three important features of the argu-
ment. First, the argument presupposes a key aspect of the Moralized View:
that ‘a legal obligation or right is none other than an obligation or right that
exists according to law’, as opposed to a ‘real’ obligation. In other words, le-
galmodifies obligation in roughly the same way that Kantian modifies obli-
gation, namely, by marking a perspective. Without this presupposition,
nothing explains why we should treat law’s claims about legal obligations
as ‘second-order’ claims.
Second, the argument presupposes that if claims about obligations, rights,
permissions, powers, and liabilities are not claims about legal obligations
et al., they must be claims about moral obligations at all. This seems to
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presuppose that there is no generic sense of obligation: i.e. that the Generic
View is false.
Third, on its face, the argument seems to turn on a simple confusion
about disjunction. Grant that legal marks a perspective, and that there is
no generic sense of obligation. If this is right, why can’t law’s claims con-
cern legal obligations? Because such claims would (necessarily?) be true,
and ‘a claim has to be capable of being true or false. It is not a claim unless
there is logical space for its falsity.’ Grant that a claim has to be capable of
being true or false: it must have a truth value. It does not follow that it must
be capable of being false! To satisfy a disjunction something need not sat-
isfy each disjunct. If there are any axioms of logic, they are claims – claims
like ‘If p, then p’ or ‘If p, then p or q’ or ‘If p and q, then p’ – even though
there is no logical space for their falsity. That logical axioms are true suf-
fices for them to have truth-values. Ditto for the law’s claims about legal
obligations and rights and so on. So even if ‘it makes no sense to attribute
to law a false claim about these legal obligations and rights’, it is unclear
why that would show that the law’s claims do not concern legal obligations
and rights.
So we have seen that the Razian commitment that necessarily law claims
moral authority plays a crucial role in arguments for the Moralized View,
and vice versa. If we have independent evidence against theMoralized View,
this puts the Razian commitment itself under considerable pressure: it may
be poorly motivated (because its defense relies on a false semantic thesis)
or it may (together with other premises that Raz and his followers accept)
entail a false semantic thesis.
There is, however, a different argument that Raz offered for theMoralized
View. Before the ‘decisive argument’ quoted above, Raz started discussing
whether ‘“duty” and “obligation” mean the same when one talks of
legal and of moral duties and obligations’ by ‘taking judges’ statements as
a test case’:
It is possible that while judges believe that legal obligations are morally binding this is not what
they saywhen they assert the validity of obligations according to law. Itmay be that all they state
is that certain relations exist between certain people and certain legal sources or laws. Their belief
that those relations give rise to a (moral) obligationmay be quite separate andmay not be part of
what they actually say when asserting obligations according to the law. But such an interpreta-
tion seems contrived and artificial.62
This suggests a different argument for the Moralized View. And one that
also provides a rationale for the first premise of the ‘decisive argument’
above:
Judges, if anyone, take the law as it claims it should be taken. They more than anyone acknowl-
edge the law at its own estimation. To understand legal statements we should interpret them as
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meant by those who take them and accept them at face value, those who acknowledge the law in
the way it claims a right to be acknowledged.63
Let’s walk through this. The most central commitment here is that we
should ‘understand legal statements’ by ‘interpret[ing] them as meant by
those who take them and accept them at face value’, namely judges. This
is key to how we could get from the Razian commitment that law claims
authority to the Moralized View. Assume, for the moment, that the Razian
commitment is independently well-motivated: the law claims moral
authority (i.e. the law claims that legal obligations are moral obligations
arising out of the law). Since judges ‘acknowledge the law in the way it
claims a right to be acknowledged’, and take the law’s claims at face value,
they thereby take legal obligations to be moral obligations arising out of
the law. And this should guide how we understand the meaning of state-
ments about legal obligations.
So understood, Raz’s second argument can be understood as a falling
under a more general strategy for arguing for the Moralized View, which
is roughly:
P1: A sincere, competent speaker’s statements of the form ‘A is legally
obligated to φ’ expresses the speaker’s moral attitude towards A
φ-ing.
P2: If P1 is true, ‘obligated’ has a moral meaning in legal contexts.64
C: So, ‘obligated’ has a moral meaning in legal contexts.
This is a valid argument with a false conclusion, so one of the premises
must go. Given the current literature in philosophy of law, the most obvious
pressure point is the first premise. Following Raz, many have argued that
the ‘internal point of view’ that judges et al. take towards the law and express
in sincere ‘internal’ legal statements should be understood, contraHart, as a
moral point of view. Kevin Toh (2005, 2007, 2010) has argued at length
against this. Indeed, he argues that the internal point of view should be
understood in terms of the expression of a generic non-cognitive attitude,
‘acceptance’; coupled with a corresponding version of the second premise,
this yields an argument against the Moralized View and for (an expressivist
version of) the Generic View.
It is worth noting, however, that Raz’s P2 and Toh’s corresponding ver-
sion thereof rely on a Gricean metasemantic program in which we explain
‘sentence meaning’ in terms of ‘speaker meaning’. This program has been
widely adopted by expressivists, who ‘explain the meaning of a term’ via
the ‘states of mind the term can be used to express’ in sincere speech acts;
what the expressivist adds to the Gricean position is that normative terms
like obligated express non-cognitive attitudes like plans or approval or ac-
ceptance.65 Many deny not only that normative terms express non-cognitive
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attitudes, but that we should explain the meaning of terms via the states of
mind they express.66 So if one wishes to retain the view that the internal
point of view is a moral point of view, another option is to drop any alle-
giance to a metasemantic program that has been widely assumed – without
much discussion – in philosophy of law.
Indeed, it is quite striking how little has been made in philosophy of
law of another way of thinking about what ‘internal legal statements’
express, which also derives from influential work by Paul Grice (1957).
We could think that such statements pragmatically implicate that the
speaker has the relevant (moral or non-cognitive) attitude. As Holton
put the idea, ‘in making a legal judgement [the judge] will have pragmat-
ically implicated that she believes there is a moral obligation to obey that
judgement. But that doesn’t mean she thinks she has strictly and literally
said that there is a moral obligation, or said anything that entails this.’67
This allows one to grant everything that Raz or Toh would want to
say about (in Raz’s words) ‘what [judges] say when they assert the validity
of obligations according to the law’, but insist that what they say (prag-
matically) and what their statement literally means (semantically) come
apart.
There is much more to say here, of course, about both the metasemantics
and pragmatics of legal language. My point is not that we must give up on
P2 because there are alternative ways of thinking about language. It is that
we should not treat anything like P2 as a fixed commitment that (coupled
with other commitments) forces us to accept certain views about the seman-
tics of legal language, or at least, not without first exploring such
alternatives.
Where does this leave us? We have seen three common commitments
about the relationship between morality and law play a role in motivating
rivals to the Generic View: that moral and legal facts are explained
in terms of different types of facts; that necessarily the law claims moral
authority; and that the internal point of view towards the law is a
moral point of view. There are independent reasons to give up these
commitments. But I have also noted that their defenders also have the
option of rejecting the often under-discussed ancillary premise that was
supposed to show how we could move from the relevant commitment
to a claim about the semantics of normative terms in moral and legal
contexts.
In many ways, this should be regarded as a welcome result. The central
motivation that has driven philosophers of law to accept a moralized seman-
tics seems to be a core commitment about the role of moral attitudes in legal
thought and talk. Once we recognize how that commitment can be paired
with different views about metasemantics and pragmatics, we can see that
it need not drive philosophers of law to adopt an independently implausible
semantic theory.
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5. Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that we should reject the view that terms like
obligated are ambiguous inmoral and legal contexts, and reject the view that
obligated has a distinctively moral meaning in legal contexts. If this is right,
we should accept (at least as a default) the view that is largely ignored in
contemporary philosophy of law and widely accepted in other fields: that
obligated has a univocal generic meaning in moral and legal contexts. This
has implications for how we think about the relationship between morality
and law.
I do not take these arguments to be decisive. It would be awfully hubristic
to think that such a short foray into such a significant philosophical dis-
agreement would settle the underlying issues. However, I hope to have at
least clarified what this under-discussed philosophical disagreement is
about, and to have shed some light on how it can be resolved. Semantic the-
orizing should not proceed unmoored from linguistic data. If legal positivists
continue to embrace what Coleman calls ‘the moral semantics claim’ – and
if, like him,68 they take it to be ‘absolutely essential to holding together the
positivist picture of law’—they owe us an explanation of the linguistic data
that militates against this view (modifier stacking), and at least some linguis-
tic data that motivates their view.69
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1 Hart, 1982, pp. 127–128, emphasis his, internal citations omitted.
2 Hart, 1982, pp. 159–160. This reading ofHart is offered byTimothy Endicott: ‘According
to Hart, the meaning of normative language differs in morality and in law’ (Endicott, 2016).
Toh, 2005, offers some compelling reasons for rejecting this reading. I will say something about
Endicott and Toh’s views later, but I will not take a stand on the exegetic issue. I wish to thank a
referee for clarifying the difficulties in attributing the Ambiguity View to Hart.
3 See, among others, Raz, 1999; Shapiro, 2011; Green, 2002; and Coleman, 2007.
4 Coleman, 2007, pp. 592–593.
5 Finlay and Plunkett (forthcoming), for instance, are legal positivists who seem to manage
to live without the moral semantics claims; they embrace a version of the Generic View. Toh
(2005) is also a positivist who aims to embrace the Generic View (see p. 89), though elsewhere
I have raised doubts about whether he – and other expressivists – can do so. See Wodak, 2017.
6 RichardHolton (1998) is a proponent of the Ambiguity View. He argues that not only do
‘“legally obligatory” and “morally obligatory”mean different things’ (which is compatible with
any View), but that “obligatory” has different senses in the two constructions’ (p. 617).
7 See, inter alia, Kripke, 2011.
8 Sennet, 2011.
9 Wodak, 2017. For instance, here’s an application of Stanley’s (2005) Binding Test. Zoe
has three kids: Joe, Kim and Leo. Joe just promised his friend that he would not speak for five
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minutes. Kim is near a dangerous predator, and if she makes a peep it will attack her. Leo is in a
legally designated noise-reduction zone. Now consider the sentence ‘All of Zoe’s kids must be
quiet.’Heremust is used acceptably while it is implicitly relativized to different standards (moral,
prudential, legal), while being used once and bound under a universal quantifier. As Stanley dis-
cusses, this test can be used in different ways: it can appeal to linguistic intuitions about zeugma,
as well as to formal considerations about syntactic structures. I thank a referee for pushingme to
clarify this point. More can be said about these tests, of course.
10 This maxim is often credited to Grice (1989, pp. 47–49), but the underlying idea
dates back at least to Aristotle’s position that an ‘item has more than one lexical meaning
if there is no minimally specific definition covering the extension of the item as a whole,
and that it has no more lexical meanings than there are maximally general definitions
necessary to describe its extension’: Geeraerts, 1993, p. 230, paraphrasing Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics II.xiii.
11 Silk, 2014, pp. 2–3. This point was first raised by Kratzer (1977) (‘How many kinds of
“must” do we have to distinguish? How many deontic ones? How many epistemic ones? How
many dispositional ones? And how many preferential ones? Obviously many, many of each
group. We do not just refer to duties. We refer to duties of different kinds. ... All this leaves us
with many different “must”s and “can”s’, p. 339).
12 See Falkum and Vicente, 2015.
13 See Geeraerts, 1993.
14 Falkum and Vicente, 2015, p. 3. See also references therein.
15 It is worth noting that in a recent, thorough defense of the view that modals are polyse-
mous, Viebahn and Vetter (2016) respond to this type of objection by emphasizing the modesty
of their proposal: they do not ‘posit many meanings for modals’, but rather ‘just a handful of
“can”s and “may”s, one for each flavour of modality’ (p. 16). That is, they posit that modals
– ought, must, and can – are polysemous, but deontic modals are univocal: this is why their hy-
pothesis only yields a handful of meanings. By contrast, the view under consideration posits that
deontic modals are polysemous. Since there are a finite number of flavors of modality (deontic,
metaphysical, epistemic, etc.) and an indefinite number of flavors of deontic modality (moral,
legal, rational, prudential...), the hypothesis under consideration is comparatively immodest.
That is why this objection is so damning to the Ambiguity View.
16 See Swanson, 2007, p. 1195.
17 For discussion, Finlay, 2014, pp. 55 ff. See also Chrisman, 2007 (especially pp. 308–9) for
further critical discussion of the hypothesis that ought is lexically ambiguous.
18 See especially von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008.
19 For instance, Hart (1982) suggested that a cognitivist theory is well suited to moral con-
texts but a ‘different, non-cognitive theory’ is ‘(f)ar better adapted to the legal case’: pp. 159–
160. As was noted above, there are exegetical questions about whether this was indeed Hart’s
view. But the main issue here is noting where the motivations that push Hart to suggest this ver-
sion of an Ambiguity View lead. See Wodak, 2017, for further discussion.
20 The disagreement is widely discussed indirectly, insofar as it relates to a contentious issue
in philosophy of law: whether speakers express the same kind of (moral or generic) attitude in
claims about moral and legal obligations (for discussion, see below, §4.2).
21 See footnote 26 and 29, below, and surrounding text.
22 See footnotes 41 and 42, below, and surrounding text.
23 I am treating ‘worlds’ as equivalent to sets of propositions, but nothing hangs on this; I use
‘worlds’ a few times in these paragraphs simply because it is somewhat easier to track than talk
of sets of propositions being consistent with the intersections of other sets of propositions.
24 As this example hopefully illustrates, the circumstantial background and ordering
source are both represented with similar descriptive propositions: the requirement that ‘In C,
everyone must not φ’ is represented as ‘In C, no one φs.’ A truth-conditional account
of the meaning of deontic modals would not get us far if it invoked deontic modals in the
explanans.
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25 See Horty, 2014, p. 424, n.2, and references therein. Horty advocates abandoning this
‘classical’ semantics, but does not defend the view that ought et al. are ambiguous (p. 450); in
fact, he seems to be committed to rejecting that view (p. 430).
26 To put the point briefly, if these philosophers of law adopt something like the formal se-
mantics above and the distinction between sources and perspectives below, they are under far
less pressure to adopt (quite implausible) generalizations of their view about legal to other mod-
ifiers like grammatical. (Recall footnote 11 and surrounding text.) There is much uncertainty
among philosophers of law about whether the Moralized View should be generalized to other
uses of normative terms, such as claims about what one grammatically ought to do, or uses of
deontic modals in games. (Cf. Raz, 1999, p. 176 and Gardner, 2012, p. 136 here.) It is a signif-
icant cost to the Moralized View about legally ought if it forces us to posit and explain the exis-
tence of a grammatical normative theory, such that what we grammatically ought to do means
what we morally ought to do according to the grammatical point of view. This is an important
reason for proponents of the Moralized View to welcome the result that they need not take up
arms against a Kratzerian formal semantics like the one illustrated above.
27 Should such a difference appear in the formal apparatus? And if not, why not? These are
interesting questions, but they threaten to draw us off of our main thread. So let me just say this:
I take it to be an advantage of semantic theory if it can explain myriad uses of ordinary terms
with minimal machinery; adding new bits and bobs of formal machinery to cover subtle differ-
ences in use quickly yields something unwieldy. Somemight disagree here: so they may offer dif-
ferent, incompatible formal apparati for the Generic and Moralized View, respectively.
28 Shapiro, 2011, p. 191.
29 As I noted above (footnote 26), theMoralized View need not force its proponents to take
on this implausible commitment. For discussion of why it is ill-motivated, see Toh, 2007, espe-
cially at pp. 417-418, noting that ‘aside frommoral statements, (there are) other normative state-
ments that carry the purport of giving objective or categorical reasons. Statements of aesthetics,
etiquette and prudence come to mind.’ (This point is further developed in relation to ‘rules’ and
reasons in Toh, 2010, p. 1292.) So the observation that legal statements or bare deontic modals
purport to give objective or categorical reasons does not mean that they must be understood as
moral (if ‘moral’ is used in a non-stipulative sense, such that the claim is non-trivial). For a more
plausible motivation for the commitment Shapiro embraces here, see Thomson, 2008, and for a
compelling response, see Finlay, 2014, pp. 235–236.
30 Kratzer, 1991, p. 646.
31 This is in his complex discussion of how Kratzerian approaches should handle inconsis-
tent obligations. Ridge (2014) also implies that he takes legal and moral to modify obligation
in the exact sameway: ‘each obligation can, while still being a genuinely legal (or moral, or what-
ever) obligation, be indexed to a different specific law’ (p. 34).
32 John Broome (2007) notes that ‘requirements issue from various sources: morality, pru-
dence, evidence, Catholicism and so on. Each source sets up a system of requirements.’ Broome
makes a different distinction to the one below. He distinguishes source requirements from
property requirements. The latter ‘follows the model of “survival requires”. “Survival” is the
name of a property. “Survival requires you to eat” means that your eating is a necessary
condition for your possessing the property of survival. It means that, necessarily, if you survive
you eat. Correspondingly, “Morality requires you to be kind to strangers”means that, necessar-
ily, if you are moral – if you have the property of morality – you are kind to strangers.’ Broome
claims that source requirements ‘follow the model of “the law requires”. The law is a source of
requirements, and ‘the law’ is not ambiguous (between a property and source) in the way that
“morality” and the rest are; it is never the name of a property.’
33 Coleman, 2007, p. 581. The full elaboration is: ‘Themoral semantics thesis is not the claim
that the content of law is a moral directive. It is a claim about how the content of the law can be
(accurately or truthfully) described. The moral semantics thesis is the view that the content of
law can be truthfully redescribed as expressing a moral directive or authorization. In claiming
that law calls for a moral semantics, the thought is as follows. “Mail fraud is illegal” expresses
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the directive: “mail fraud is not to be done.” That is the content of the law. The moral semantics
claim is that ‘mail fraud is not to be done can be redescribed truthfully as “mail fraud is morally
wrong”’ (p. 592). See also Coleman, 2011, pp. 22, 78.
34 Coleman, 2007, p. 593.
35 Shapiro, 2011, p. 185.
36 Raz, 1999, p. 175.
37 Raz, 1999, p. 175.
38 For Shapiro, the ‘legal point of view’ is ‘the perspective of a certain normative theory’ that
holds that the laws of the relevant legal system ‘are morally legitimate and obligating’ but is
‘silent on how to answer’ all other moral questions, 2011, pp. 185–186).
39 See Raz, 1999, ch. 1 and Postscript.
40 Green, 2002, p. 519.
41 Hershovitz, 2015, pp. 1168–1169.
42 Raz, 2009, p. 158; see also his pp. 38–39.
43 To be clear, from all that I’ve said here it may well be that all uses of obligation are really
claims aboutmoral obligations; the point is simply that we cannot infer this from the claim that
all uses of obligation share the same meaning, as Raz and Hershovitz suggest.
44 Raz (2009) offers analogies –with examples of ‘advice’ that is ‘given from a point of view’
(p. 156) – to illustrate his View, but they are better interpreted as claims about rational obliga-
tions than claims about moral obligations according to a point of view. Kantian obligation is,
at the very least, a particularly clear case of the phenomenon he has in mind.
45 See footnotes 28–29 above and surrounding text. Hershovitz (2015) offers this interpreta-
tion of legal obligation but uses ‘source’ rather than ‘ground’. I avoid ‘source’ because, like
Hershovitz, I take there to be an intuitive sense in which promises ground amoral obligation that
is distinct from the sense in which morality is a distinct source of obligations.
46 A referee offered a challenging rejoinder here: Suppose you make a promise to pick
me up from the airport, but also have familial responsibility to be home that day. In such
a case, could it be appropriate to say ‘You have a promissory moral obligation to pick
me up from the airport, but you have no moral obligation to do so’? Perhaps: it would be
charitable to read the first instance of ‘obligation’ as prima facie and/or pro tanto, and the
second as (in the referee’s words) ‘without qualification’. This reading will not always be
available: consider ‘..., but you have no moral obligation to do so whatsover’. And even if
Raz et al. are forced to adopt it, it still spells doom for their broader commitments: the se-
mantics alone would force us to accept that legal obligations are a species of qualified moral
obligations, a la the anti-positivists below. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for
raising this issue.
47 For other appeals to the Moralized View, see Coleman, 2007, and cf. Himma, 2001.
48 Shapiro, 2011, p. 47.
49 Raz, 1999, pp. 154–5 and passim.
50 Raz, 1999, pp. 175–76.
51 As Shapiro notes (2011, p. 422 fn. 23, pp. 414–415 fn. 44), his solution to the problem
(see below) is ‘heavily indebted to the work of Joseph Raz’, but does not share two related
commitments that are central to Raz’s view: (a) that statements like (2) can ‘express a normative
proposition – a proposition about what ought to be done—and yet have descriptive truth-condi-
tions’, and (b) the ‘unorthodox semantic theory’ that we do not individuate propositions ‘accord-
ing to their truth conditions.”’
52 Shapiro, 2011, p. 188.
53 For example, Shapiro rejects Austin’s positivism, which ‘permits the derivation of an
ought from an is’ by denying that ‘concepts such as ... OBLIGATION are descriptive in nature.’
Shapiro ‘agrees with Austin that legal statements are descriptive,’ but ‘maintains that the
main concepts that they employ are moral and hence normative’ (2011, p. 191).
54 This does not characterize all motivations that have been canvassed in the literature. The
Moralized View is often motivated by alleged failures of the Ambiguity View and/or Hart’s
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view; we already saw this above (in §2), and it is also true ofmany of the arguments discussed and
criticized at length by Toh (2007, 2010). With one exception, I set these arguments aside, in part
because I agree with much of what Toh says in defense of Hart, and in part because once we rec-
ognize that there are other alternatives toHart’s view that these arguments leave unscathed, they
cannot succeed as arguments for the Moralized View in particular.
55 Holton, 1998, p. 617.
56 The former option is taken by Dworkin (2011), Greenberg (2014) and Hershovitz (2015).
There are moments where Hart flirted with the latter option, though I do not think it reflects his
considered view given his commitments in Hart, 1994, ch. 8.
57 Toh, 2005, p. 107
58 Notably, according to most Kratzerian views, modals are univocal. This does not mean
that facts involving metaphysical, epistemic, and deontic modals are made true in virtue of the
same facts.
59 Raz, 1984, p. 131.
60 For discussion of how Raz’s arguments for the view that necessarily law claims to be
morally authoritative tacitly rely on the Moralized View, see Himma, 2001, pp. 288–296.
Kramer (1999) also points out that ‘one cannot sustain Raz’s view (about law’s claim to moral
authority) by simply pointing to legal officials’ use of deontic terms such as “obligation” and
“duty”. Any such terminological observation would patently beg the question’ (p. 385).
61 Gardner, 2012, p. 133, internal references omitted.
62 Raz, 1984, p. 131.
63 Raz, 1984, p. 131.
64 A wrinkle must be acknowledged here. Standardly, those who appeal to principles like
P2 appeal foremost to what is expressed in sincere uses of a term. But some of Raz’s central
arguments turn on the expression of sincere or pretend moral attitudes in ‘internal’ and
‘detached’ legal statements of the form ‘A is legally obligated to φ’, respectively. For
discussion of Raz’s appeals to detached statements, see Toh, 2007, pp. 407–414, and Toh,
2010, pp. 1290.
65 See Gibbard, 2003, p. 7, and see also Gibbard, 1990.
66 This is, I take it, what Endicott (2016) intends to deny when he writes that ‘Hart had
nothing to say about the meaning of normative expressions such as “ought” and “must” or
“obligation” or “right” (except that their meaning differs in law and in morality). He only
pointed out that people display an attitude when they use such language.’
67 Holton, 1998, p. 611. I discuss a similar pragmatic view about the relation between the
expression of speakers’ non-cognitive attitudes and theGeneric View inWodak, 2017. And sim-
ilar appeals to pragmatics are explored by Finlay and Plunkett, forthcoming.
68 Coleman, 2007, pp. 592–593.
69 I would like to thank Hrafn Asgeirsson, Philip Pettit, David Plunkett, Samuel Preston,
Gideon Rosen, Michael Smith, Jack Woods, two referees Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and
audiences at Princeton, Stanford, and the University of Sydney Law School.
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